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1. Introduction 
 Social researchers (Akerlof 1980; Elster 1989; Fehr and Fischbacher 2004) often stress that 
punishment and reward are important to foster cooperation and enforce social norms.1 In addition, they 
also point out that both monetary and non-monetary sanctions play a role in this respect.2 A burgeoning 
experimental literature attests to these statements. On one hand, part of this literature shows that the 
availability of monetary punishment and reward promotes cooperation, generosity, and fairness (Güth et 
al. 1982; Ostrom et al. 1992; Roth et al. 1995; Fehr and Gächter 2000; Andreoni et al. 2003; Falk et al. 
2005; Sefton et al. 2007; Vyrastekova and van Soest 2008). On the other hand, several laboratory studies 
show that even non-monetary punishment and reward can foster pro-social behaviors (Masclet et al. 
2003; Rege and Telle 2004; Noussair and Tucker 2005; Ellingsen and Johannesson 2008; Xiao and 
Houser 2009, López-Pérez and Vorsatz 2010). 
 Why does behavior change when sanctions become feasible? One potential reason is that people 
expect to be sanctioned for certain choices and change their behavior to avoid negative sanctions and 
seek out positive ones. In light of this, it is natural to ask whether people have accurate expectations 
regarding sanctions, both monetary and non-monetary. This paper addresses this question 
experimentally.3 Our research question may shed light on several social phenomena. As a first 
illustration, consider cooperation and compliance with social norms when sanctions are possible. For 
any particular sanction to be effective in promoting compliance with a social norm or an etiquette rule, it 
seems necessary that the potential recipients of the sanction anticipate it. A restaurant customer, for 
instance, may leave a generous tip if the quality of the service is good. Yet this positive sanction cannot 
have any effect ex ante on the waiter’s service unless he correctly anticipates their potential occurrence 
and the kind of service that will foster them – e.g., opening a bottle of wine in front of the customers. As 
a second illustration of the importance of accurate expectations, consider the ultimatum game. In this 
well-known bargaining game, a first mover proposes a division of some money between herself and a 
second mover, who can accept or reject the proposal. The division is implemented if it is accepted, 
whereas both players receive zero if it is rejected. Abundant experimental evidence, starting from Güth 
                                                 
1
 As in the classic study by Coleman (1990), we will use the term sanctions as an umbrella term to refer both to punishment 
(negative sanctions) and rewards (positive sanctions).  
2
 Examples of non-monetary punishment include disapproval, humiliation, insults, shaming and ostracism, while social 
approval, honors, and praise are examples of non-monetary rewards.  
3
 Our focus is on expectations in one-shot games, not on whether people learn and improve their expectations with time in 
repeated games. In any case, note that both questions are probably related: If the initial expectations affect behavior in the 
present period, this might in turn affect the future expectations and behavior via a learning process.   
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et al. (1982), shows that proposals are often rejected if they give little money to the second mover (even 
if the amount is strictly positive), which can be interpreted as a negative sanction of an unfair offer. 
Whatever the reasons, the evidence clearly suggests that bargaining impasses are more likely if 
bargainers under-estimate the potential negative reactions of the other party.  
To study accuracy, our experiment uses four games and two treatments (with monetary and non-
monetary sanctions, respectively). In each game, we elicit one player’s beliefs regarding a co-player’s 
sanctioning behavior. The four games are selected so as to induce different motivations for punishment 
and reward. Since our design is within-subjects, we can investigate whether players are able to anticipate 
the differences in these motivations across games. In addition, our two treatments allow us to investigate 
the expectations about each type of sanctions, to check whether people predict one better than the other, 
and infer whether they expect differences across treatments. 
 Our key results for both treatments are the following. In those situations where the average actual 
sanction is significantly different from zero and hence has a definite sign (i.e., non-null), first, subjects 
tend to anticipate that sign – i.e., they anticipate whether punishment or rewards are prevalent. Second, 
expectations co-vary with sanctions in most situations in both treatments, suggesting that people foresee 
the differences across games and treatments. Third, expectations are not significantly different on 
average from sanctions in a large majority of the situations, suggesting that people are not systematically 
biased in their expectations. Fourth, the average error is never larger than 35% (27%) of the maximum 
possible error in any game of the treatment with monetary (non-monetary) sanctions. Arguably, 
therefore, relative errors are moderate, particularly with regard to non-monetary sanctions. In fact, fifth, 
we observe that average errors are often significantly smaller in the non-monetary treatment. Hence, it 
seems that people anticipate better non-monetary sanctions. Finally, we find some evidence that people 
predict punishment better than rewards, as most exceptions to the previous results occur in those 
situations where rewards are frequent. This evidence suggests a relative advantage of punishment in 
providing incentives. 
In the rest of the paper, we first describe and motivate our experimental design and procedures in 
section 2. Section 3 presents and discusses our results in both treatments. Section 4 concludes with a 
brief review of some related literature on beliefs, a discussion of some implications of our data, and 
some ideas for further research. 
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2. Experimental Design and Procedures 
 Our experimental design consists of a Monetary (M) and a Non-Monetary (NM) treatment. Each 
subject participated only in one treatment. We describe first the M-treatment. Participants played four 
two-player games, each with a two-stage structure. In the first stage, one player (the decider, or A) 
chooses between two allocations of money for herself and another player (the sanctioner, or B).4 Table 1 
shows the two (decider, sanctioner) payoff allocations available in each game (called left and right; in 
what follows, we denote by 1L the left-hand allocation in game 1, by 2R the right-hand allocation in 
game 2, and so on). Payoffs are presented in points, at the exchange rate 10 points = 1 Euro; we 
motivate the selected payoff constellations later. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 In the second stage, the sanctioner can impose a monetary punishment or reward on the decider, 
at a fixed cost of five points for the sanctioner.5 More precisely, the sanctioner can either increase or 
decrease the decider’s payoff by up to 100 points, but for that she must pay five points from her 
allocation share.6 If the sanctioner does not want to affect the decider’s balance, no points are deducted 
from her own. As an illustration, suppose that the decider chooses allocation (250, 100) in game 1. If the 
sanctioner decides not to pay the five points, this allocation is implemented. If she pays the five points 
fee, however, she can choose a “point score” s ∈ [-100, 100] so that the decider’s payoff in the game is 
250 + s, while the sanctioner gets a payoff of 100-5 = 95. For simplicity, s had to be a multiple of 10. 
Note that our simple technology of punishment/reward probably facilitates the already complex task of 
predicting sanctions. Since there is still little evidence on expectations about sanctions, a simple 
technology seems convenient for our research question.  
 The NM-treatment is identical to the M-treatment, with one important difference: In the second 
stage of each game, the sanctioner cannot affect the monetary payoff of the co-player, but approve or 
disapprove her choice –i.e., she can reward or punish the decider in a non-monetary manner. As in the 
                                                 
4
 In the subjects’ instructions, the decider was always called ‘A’, and the sanctioner was referred to as ‘B’. 
5
 We avoided the terms “punishment” and “reward” in the instructions. 
6
 This small fee prevents random choices from selfish players, which could theoretically occur if sanctioning was not costly 
and would complicate the interpretation of our results. 
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M-treatment, the sanctioner must pay a fixed cost of five points for that. If she pays the five points, she 
can send an “evaluation score” s ∈ [-100, 100] to the decider expressing either approval or disapproval 
of the decider’s choice. To achieve common knowledge in this respect, the instructions explicitly used 
the words “approval” for positive scores and “disapproval” for negative scores. Hence, an evaluation 
score of s = +100 means maximal approval, and s = -100 means maximal disapproval. As an illustration 
of the payoff structure, suppose that the decider chooses allocation (250, 100) in game 1. Since the 
sanctioner cannot affect the decider’s balance in this treatment, the latter is then sure to get a payoff of 
250. With respect to the sanctioner, she would get a payoff of 100 – 5 = 95 if she sends an evaluation 
score and a payoff of 100 otherwise. We note that our approval/disapproval technology is an adaptation 
of that used by Masclet et al. (2003).  
The experimental procedures were identical in both treatments. We conducted seven sessions at 
the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, and a total of 92 subjects participated in the M-treatment (four 
sessions), and 84 in the NM-treatment (three sessions). Subjects were students from different disciplines 
(9.6 percent came from the faculty of economics) and not students of the experimenters. Further, the 
share of female participants was 54 percent in the M-treatment and 69 percent in the NM-treatment. 
Before the start of each session, we distributed instruction and decision sheets (dependent on role) in a 
classroom, leaving enough space between seats to ensure anonymity. Then the subjects entered the 
room. The sheets were initially covered and the subjects could freely choose their seat; in that manner, 
we assigned them to be either a decider or a sanctioner. Subjects could read the instructions at their own 
pace and questions were answered in private. Before proceeding with their decisions, participants had to 
fill out control questions to make sure that they understood the rules. 
In each treatment, subjects played the same four games in the same role and with the same 
anonymous co-player. To prevent income effects, we paid subjects for their decisions in just one game, 
randomly selected at the end of the experiment. Further, no subject was informed of her counterpart’s 
actual choice in any game in order to avoid repeated game effects and changes of mood which would 
severely complicate the data analysis (e.g., the mood of a sanctioner could change depending on the 
decider’s choice in a preceding game). Therefore, we employed the strategy method to elicit the 
decisions of the sanctioners, i.e., they indicated in each allocation of each game whether they wanted to 
pay the five points fee, and if this was the case, we asked them which score s ∈  [-100, 100] they wanted 
to assign to their co-player. Finally, we presented all four games on the same decision sheet to prevent 
potential order effects that could appear if the games were presented one by one. It is worth noting that 
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some of these design features might affect behavior and thus possibly expectations. For instance, 
sanctioners in our setting could attempt to play in a consistent manner across games, potentially 
generating ‘spillovers’ from one game to another.7 Hence some prudence is warranted when 
extrapolating our results to other settings, like one in which subjects play only one game. In any case, 
we believe that our within-subjects design provides strong evidence on whether people anticipate 
changes in sanction patterns across games.   
In both treatments, we elicited the deciders’ expectations with regard to the sanctioners’ 
behavior. More precisely, we asked two questions for each allocation: (i) The percentage of sanctioners 
who would pay the 5 points fee at that allocation, and (ii) the average score assigned by those 
sanctioners. Letting pe and se respectively denote the expectations (i) and (ii) of a generic decider at one 
allocation, we henceforth refer to the product pe ·  se of these two numbers as the expectation by that 
decider at that allocation. Subjects were not paid for answering questions (i) and (ii). This has one 
potential shortcoming but also some advantages. The shortcoming is that it cannot be completely ruled 
out that some subjects report falsely their expectations, maybe choosing randomly. Paying for accuracy, 
in contrast, would arguably reduce any incentive to misreport. Yet we doubt that many subjects chose 
randomly, as it would be extremely difficult to make sense of our data in that case (we provide specific 
examples later). Alternatively, subjects might respond sincerely but reflect less on their answers if they 
are not paid for accuracy, possibly augmenting the variance of the expectations – Gächter and Renner 
(2010) discuss this issue.8 Yet we do not view a casual level of reflection as a shortcoming (see the 
second advantage below). On the positive side, we find at least three advantages. First, our data facilitate 
comparison with previous studies. For instance, our results are arguably relevant to understand behavior 
in the numerous experiments on punishment and reward where subjects are not paid for accuracy (see 
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 As another example, the strategy method might induce different behavior than the direct-response method where 
participants know the choice made by the co-player – e.g., Casari and Cason (2009). Yet Brandts and Charness (2009) review 
the experimental studies that use both methods and find no treatment differences in most of them. Moreover, they find that 
differences are particularly unlikely in experiments in which players make numerous choices (as in ours). 
8
 There is still an ongoing debate on whether incentivized belief elicitation increases accuracy. For example, Gächter and 
Renner (2010) elicit subjects’ beliefs in a 10-times repeated public good game, and compare incentivized and non-
incentivized elicitation. They find no differences across treatments in the absolute average error in period 1, whereas the error 
is significantly smaller in the incentivized treatment in the remaining periods. Hence, their data suggests that incentives affect 
the way in which people’s beliefs change, but not the initial beliefs. Provided that this result can be generalized, it would be 
clearly relevant in our games, as they are one-shot. 
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Gächter and Renner, 2010 for some examples). Second, we believe that our data facilitate extrapolation 
to behavior out of the lab where, generally, people are not paid by others to form accurate beliefs about 
punishment and reward. If we provided incentives and they affected accuracy, in contrast, it would not 
be so clear that our results are relevant to understand behavior out of the lab. Finally, paying for the 
beliefs would change the expected distribution of payoffs, and that should theoretically affect the 
behavior of those sanctioners with preferences like inequity-aversion (they should condition their 
behavior on their expectations that the decider has accurate expectations), complicating the 
interpretation of our results.  
After subjects made their decisions in the four games, they answered a brief questionnaire. Then 
we collected their decision sheets and selected the payoff-relevant game. Subjects were paid privately, 
and earned on average 18.3 Euros in the M-treatment and 20.6 Euros in the NM-treatment. All deciders 
were informed at the time of payment about the score (if any) sent by his/her sanctioner at the payoff-
relevant allocation.9 Each session lasted approximately 60 minutes.10 
We finish this section with a discussion of our payoff constellation. The goal was to induce 
variability in sanctions across allocations. In this manner, we can analyze whether the deciders anticipate 
the varying behavior of the sanctioners, and whether some situations are more prone to error. Based on 
several experimental studies (Leibbrandt and López-Pérez 2010a survey this literature), we expected 
inequity-aversion and reciprocity to be key motivators for monetary sanctions in our games. To induce 
variability, therefore, we selected allocations in which either (i) both motives predict 
punishment/reward, (ii) only one of these motives predicts punishment/reward, or (iii) none of them 
predicts either punishment or reward. Table 2 indicates the allocations of the four games in which 
inequity-aversion and reciprocity predict the occurrence of punishment or reward. To understand these 
predictions, note that models of inequity-aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000) 
predict punishment if the decider has a larger payoff than the sanctioner, and reward if the decider has a 
smaller payoff; whereas reciprocity models like Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) – based on Rabin 
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  Subjects knew in advance that the experimenter was going to observe their payoff-relevant decision, which may have 
affected their choices (e.g., Cox and Deck, 2005) and perhaps their beliefs. Hence, some caution is also warranted when 
extrapolating our results to other settings with an increased social distance. 
10
 The instructions for the deciders in the M-treatment and the NM-treatment, translated from Spanish to English, are 
available in a web appendix at https://sites.google.com/site/kisshub/home/research/webappendix-southern-economic-journal. 
We also provide one example of a decision sheet for the M-treatment, to illustrate how beliefs were elicited.  
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(1993) – predict punishment if the sanctioner is harmed by the decider’s choice (i.e., in our games if the 
decider chooses the allocation where the sanctioner’s payoff is smallest), and reward if she is helped.11 
Table 2 about here 
 
 Our payoff constellation is also convenient for the NM-treatment, as we again expected some 
variability in sanctions across allocations. We must first clarify, however, that the models of inequity-
aversion and reciprocity listed above cannot explain the occurrence of non-monetary sanctions, as these 
behaviors are costly in our design and cannot reduce inequity or be used to reciprocate (in a material 
manner). Yet models like Holländer (1990) and Kandel and Lazear (1992) predict that sanctioners 
approve (disapprove) choices that help (harm) them. Hence, they predict non-monetary 
reward/punishment in the same allocations where models of reciprocity predict monetary 
reward/punishment in the M-treatment (see Table 2), thus generating differences in sanctions across 
allocations. Our design allows us to investigate if the deciders foresee these potential variations. 
3. Results 
 In this section, we compare sanctions and expectations, that is, the actual sanctions by the 
sanctioners (i.e., the scores s chosen by them at each allocation; note that we set s = 0 when a sanctioner 
does not pay the 5 points fee), and the expectations in this regard of the deciders, respectively. We 
perform this comparison for every allocation of each treatment. Our first aim is to investigate whether 
the deciders are able to anticipate the sign and strength of the average sanction in each allocation of the 
four games (Section 3.1), and the size of the errors committed (3.2). While these two initial sections 
have a descriptive nature, we afterwards explore potential determinants of the sanctions by the 
sanctioners and the prediction errors by the deciders, suggesting one encompassing explanation and 
offering some evidence (3.3). Finally, we discuss the choices of the deciders in both treatments (3.4). 
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 These predictions hold for a very large range of the models’ parameters. The reader may consult Leibbrandt and López-
Pérez (2010a) for a more detailed discussion. For simplicity, the predictions in Table 2 only specify the sign of the predicted 
sanction, not its strength – e.g., inequity aversion predicts a sanction of -55 points in allocation 1R.  
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3.1 Expectations of the deciders: Accuracy 
Do the deciders accurately estimate the average sanction at each allocation? To answer this 
question, we first study whether they at least correctly anticipate the sign of the average sanction, and 
later move a step further and analyze whether they accurately anticipate its strength. 
Studying the sign is an important first step, as a punishment (negative sign) is qualitatively very 
different from a reward (positive sign). Table 3 reports for each allocation in both treatments the 
percentage of deciders who expect either a positive or a negative sanction (the remaining deciders 
expect a null sanction). The variable employed is the expectation by each decider at each allocation. 
Recall from Section 2 that this variable represents the average sanction expected by each decider at each 
allocation, as it equals the corresponding product pe ·  se: the percentage of sanctioners who are expected 
to pay the 5 points fee at that allocation multiplied by the average expected score from those players. For 
instance, 21.7 and 69.6 percent of the deciders report an expectation with positive and negative sign, 
respectively, at allocation 1L in the M-treatment. Now, the sign of the average sanction at allocation 1L 
happens to be negative (Table 4 below reports the precise average sanction at each allocation of each 
treatment). Consequently, the percentage of deciders who correctly anticipate the sanction sign at this 
allocation equals 69.6 (i.e., the sign of their expectation coincides with the sign of the corresponding 
average sanction), as we indicate in bold in the table. 
 
Table 3 about here 
Our focus is on those allocations where the average sanction is significantly different from zero 
at the 10 percent level: Since the average sanction has a very clear sign (either positive or negative) at 
these allocations, it makes sense to ask if subjects can anticipate it. With respect to the M-treatment, the 
average sanction is significant at the 10 percent level at allocations 1L, 2L, 3L and 4R (Mann-Whitney 
test, in fact p < 0.01 always). As one can confirm from Table 3, more than two thirds of the subjects 
correctly anticipate the sign in these allocations, and a one-sample test of proportion rejects the 
hypothesis that these figures are equal to 50 percent (p < 0.01 always). In the NM-treatment, in turn, the 
average sanction is significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level at all allocations except 1R, 
and we observe that most subjects anticipate correctly the sign of the average sanction at all these 
allocations except 3R, where only 36.6 percent of the subjects properly forecast a positive sanction. 
Furthermore, the proportion of correct sign predictions is significantly higher than 0.5 at the 10 percent 
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significance level at allocations 1L, 2L, 2R, 3L, and 4R (p < 0.07 always). We summarize our findings 
for both treatments as follows: 
Result 1: In 4 (7) allocations of the M-treatment (NM-treatment), the average actual sanction is 
significantly different from zero and hence has a clear sign. In almost all these allocations, the fraction 
of deciders who accurately anticipate the corresponding sign is larger (mostly significantly) than 50 
percent. The only exception is allocation 3R of the NM-treatment, where rewards are prevalent but most 
deciders fail to anticipate it.  
We now investigate if, on average, deciders correctly predict the strength of the average 
sanction. For each allocation of each treatment, Table 4 reports the average expectation across all 
deciders – e.g., the average decider expects a sanction of -26.47 points at allocation 1L of the M-
treatment –, and the average actual sanction by the sanctioners. Table 4 also indicates the median and 
standard deviation of each variable.12  
Table 4 about here 
We can see that the average expectation is similar to the average sanction in most allocations of 
both treatments, suggesting that the average decider anticipates the average sanction rather accurately.13 
Indeed, the two-sided Mann-Whitney test almost never rejects at the 10 percent level the hypothesis that 
the average expectation and sanction at each allocation are equal (see Section W3 of the web appendix 
for the precise p-values of the tests). The only exceptions occur at allocations 3L (p-value < 0.1) and 4R 
(p-value < 0.01) of the M-treatment, and allocation 3R of the NM-treatment (p-value < 0.01)  
Figure 1 uses a box-and-whisker plot to offer more disaggregated evidence on the subjects’ 
accuracy in the M-treatment. The darker (lighter) boxes correspond to the sanctions (expectations) at 
each allocation. Each box represents the inter-quartile range of the corresponding variable, while the 
upper/lower whiskers (that is, the adjacent dashed lines) extend to the maximum/minimum value of the 
corresponding variable that is within the 1.5 inter-quartile range from both quartiles. For instance, at 
allocation 2L the highest sanction within that range is 100, and the highest expectation is 50. The crosses 
represent outlying values. Further, the black circles (thick lines) indicate averages (medians) of each 
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 For further detail, consult the cumulative distribution functions of the expectations and the sanctions at each allocation of 
each treatment, available in the web appendix. See also section W4 in that appendix for additional data on sanctions. 
13
 This is one signal that most subjects reported their expectations in a non-random manner. Another signal is that 
expectations vary considerably across allocations. 
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variable; the precise figures appear in Table 4. Note as well that the allocations have been ordered on the 
X-axis from those with the lowest average sanction (on the left) to those with the highest average 
sanction (on the right). We remark that this ordering coincides with the ordering according to the 
median, although this last ordering is less informative due to the fact that at 4 allocations the median 
equals zero. In turn, Figure 2 is the analogue of Figure 1 for the NM-treatment; allocations have been 
ordered as in Figure 1 to facilitate comparison. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Two things stand out in these figures. First, expectations co-vary with sanctions. One indication 
of this is that the ranking of the allocations according to the average sanction roughly coincides with the 
ranking according to the average expectation: Subjects tend to anticipate which allocations will be most 
highly punished or rewarded. Second, the variation in the expectations (lighter boxes) is smaller than 
that of the sanctions, a somehow natural point given that the deciders’ expectations focus on the average 
value of the sanctions: unless deciders are extremely inaccurate and heterogeneous in this regard, one 
would expect their expectations to vary less than the observations from the whole distribution. For 
further evidence, we use Levene’s test to assess whether the variances of the expectations and the 
sanctions are equal.14 In the M-treatment, the null hypothesis that the variances are equal is rejected at 
the 10 percent significance level at all allocations except 3L and 4L. In the NM-treatment, in turn, the 
null hypothesis is rejected at the 1 percent level at any allocation. In a similar line, the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test rejects at 10 percent significance level the hypothesis that expectations and sanctions come 
from the same distribution at all allocations, except 1R, 2R, and 4L of the M-treatment (p-value > 0.12), 
and allocation 4L of the NM-treatment (p-value > 0.16).   
Figure 2 about here 
We summarize our findings for both treatments as follows: 
Result 2: The average expectation is not significantly different than the average sanction at most 
allocations in the M-treatment (in 6 out of 8 cases) and the NM-treatment (in 7 out of 8 cases). In the 
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 We use Levene’s test because it is robust to non-normality of the error distribution. 
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only exceptions, rewards are frequent and strong. Further, expectations are less dispersed around the 
mean than actual sanctions. 
Result 2 relates to the question of whether punishment is better anticipated than reward, which is 
important for understanding the effectiveness of each type of sanction: for instance, punishment could 
be more effective in changing behavior if the potential receiver anticipates it better than rewards. In this 
respect, several phenomena suggest that subjects tend to anticipate the ‘stick’ better than the ‘carrot’ in 
our games. First, average expectations and sanctions in the M-treatment are significantly different only 
at allocations 3L and 4R, the two allocations where the average sanction reaches its highest positive 
level.15 Second, average expectations and sanctions in the NM-treatment present a significant difference 
only at allocation 3R, and again rewards are strong at this allocation. In our games, consequently, a 
necessary condition for average expectations and sanctions not to coincide at one allocation seems to be 
that rewards are strong at that allocation. As Result 1 indicates, third, allocation 3R in the NM-treatment 
is the only one in which most subjects fail to anticipate the sign of the (significant) sanction. While all 
this evidence is preliminary and further experimental tests are warranted, we provide below  additional 
support for the idea that the ‘stick’ is better anticipated than the ‘carrot’, particularly with respect to 
monetary sanctions. 
So far we have mostly compared average expectations and sanctions. Yet expectations are 
defined as the product pe ·  se of the expected percentage of sanctioners paying the fee to sanction, and 
the expected sanction from them. In a more disaggregated analysis, therefore, it makes sense to compare 
the average values of pe and se to their actual average values. In this manner, we investigate if the 
average decider fails to anticipate any of these variables. Table A in the appendix shows the percentages 
and the sanctions that subjects expect, together with the average actual counterparts.  
3.2 The prediction error 
The previous section showed that, on average, subjects predict sanctions rather accurately at 
most allocations in both treatments. On the individual level, nevertheless, deciders frequently estimate 
the strength of the sanction with some error. To show some initial evidence in this respect, we define a 
decider’s absolute error at one allocation as the absolute difference between the expectation by that 
decider at that allocation and the corresponding average sanction. Table 5 depicts the average absolute 
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 In fact, these are the only allocations where the average sanction is significantly higher than zero (hence, deciders are 
strongly rewarded), the p-values being less than 0.01 in both cases (Mann-Whitney test). 
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error at each allocation of each treatment; this is 35.61 at allocation 1L in the M-treatment, for 
instance.16 We observe that this average absolute error is high in many allocations and in fact 
significantly higher than zero in all allocations of both treatments (Mann-Whitney test, p-value < 0.01).  
Table 5 about here 
While the absolute error provides some insights, it has also some shortcomings when making 
comparisons across allocations. As an illustration, it is different to commit an absolute error of 20 units 
when the average sanction is 100 than when it is zero. In the first prediction problem, one can commit an 
absolute error as large as 200 (i.e., if one predicts -100), so that an error of 20 seems low. In the second 
case, the largest possible absolute error is 100, and an error of 20 appears to be more substantial. To 
provide a normalized measure of the error that takes into account this problem, we define a subject’s 
relative error at one allocation as her absolute error divided by the largest absolute error possible – 
observe that the largest absolute error at any allocation equals the average sanction at that allocation plus 
100, as the previous examples illustrate. So defined, the relative error takes values between zero and 1; 
low values suggest that a subject did rather well in anticipating sanctions. In Table 5, we present the 
average relative error at each allocation as a percentage – i.e., multiplied by 100.  
We make a number of remarks on Table 5. First, the absolute and the relative error are correlated 
within each treatment, which is not surprising given that the relative errors are just a normalized version 
of their absolute counterparts. Second, the average relative errors are never larger than 35 % in the M-
treatment, and never larger than 27% in the NM-treatment. Hence, subjects commit errors, but of a 
limited size in average, particularly in the NM-treatment.  
This latter point merits some attention: Do deciders commit larger mistakes in predicting 
monetary sanctions? The relative errors allow for a meaningful comparison across treatments. In this 
respect, the Mann-Whitney test rejects equality of the relative error at the 1 percent level at all 
allocations except 2L (p-value > 0.19), 2R (p-value > 0.20), and 4L (p-value  > 0.09). It follows that the 
relative error is significantly lower in the NM-treatment for almost all remaining allocations, a signal 
that the deciders have more problems to foresee monetary sanctions in our games. Note that the only 
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 To put this figure in context, consider an allocation where the average sanction is equal to s and a hypothetical individual 
who tries to predict s by randomly picking a number between -100 and 100. One can show that the average absolute error 
would then be equal to 50 + s2/200. In allocation 1L, for instance, s = -26.47 so that the average error should therefore be 
53.5. This figure is larger than the average absolute error in this allocation (35.6), and in fact this happens in all allocations. 
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exception to this statement occurs in allocation 3R, where relative errors are significantly higher in the 
NM-treatment. 
Another relevant question is whether errors are higher at allocations where rewards are prevalent. 
Again, some evidence suggests this to be the case, particularly in the M-treatment. In effect, the relative 
error reaches the highest and the third highest value at allocations 3L and 4R, which are rewarded most. 
In contrast, Table 5 shows that in allocations 1L and 2L, where punishment is strongest, the relative 
error is the second and third lowest – yet we note that there is no significant difference between the error 
at 1L and 3L. The results are not so clear in the NM-treatment. Punishment is high at allocation 2L and 
yet the relative error is higher than in allocation 4R, where rewards are strong.   
We consider now whether the subjects’ errors are systematic. In this respect, the analysis in 
Section 3.1 showed that the average expectation is not significantly different than the corresponding 
average sanction at most allocations in both treatments (the only exceptions, recall, are allocations 3L 
and 4R in the M-treatment, and allocation 3R of the NM-treatment ). This fact suggests that subjects are 
not systematically biased in their expectations and that at most allocations the errors caused by 
overestimation of the average sanction by some subjects compensate the errors caused by 
underestimation by other subjects. 
To check more carefully for this possibility, we consider a signed version of the relative error. 
More precisely, a decider’s signed relative error at one allocation is defined as the relative error, but not 
in absolute value. The sign of this variable shows the direction of the error, the positive/negative sign 
indicating over/underestimation. If the distribution of deciders’ signed relative errors at one allocation 
has a non-zero median, we infer that deciders are biased in their expectations at that allocation. In this 
respect, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test rejects the hypothesis that the median is zero at the 5 per cent 
level in allocations 3L, 3R, and 4R of the M-treatment (p-values < 0.05, 0.01, and 0.01, respectively), 
and 1R, 2R, 3R and 4R of the NM-treatment (p-values < 0.05, 0.01, 0.01, and 0.05, respectively). These 
results suggest that subjects commit systematic errors at seven out of 16 allocations. Since the average 
of the signed relative error at all seven allocations happens to have a negative sign, furthermore, it 
follows that subjects systematically underestimate the average sanction at these allocations. We also 
note that the average sanction is always positive in these seven allocations. Apparently, therefore, 
subjects tend to underestimate where rewards are prevalent, but not when punishment is prevalent. 
We summarize our findings for both treatments as follows: 
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Result 3: In absolute terms, subjects tend to commit errors of a significant size. In comparison 
with the maximum possible error, however, the relative errors are moderate, particularly in the NM-
treatment. When considering the sign of the error, we observe systematic biases at those allocations 
where rewards are relatively frequent. In all these allocations, subjects tend to underestimate the average 
sanction. 
3.3 Discussion 
In this section we offer one possible explanation of our data, gathering together three questions: 
(i) how do sanctioners choose sanctions? (ii) how do deciders form expectations of sanctions? and (iii) 
why are these expectations sometimes inaccurate? We also explore and shed some evidence on question 
(iii) with the help of a regression analysis.  
The first part of our explanation considers question (i) above, that is, the determinants of the 
sanctions. This point has been analyzed in detail by Leibbrandt and López-Pérez (2010a), an 
accompanying paper focused on the sanctioners’ behavior in our experiment.17 To prevent duplication, 
therefore, we just briefly summarize their key results, starting with the M-treatment. Although many 
factors are at play in these games, Leibbrandt and López-Pérez (2010a) reckon that both inequity 
aversion and reciprocity are the crucial forces behind monetary punishment and rewards. This result is in 
line with previous studies stressing the importance of both forces (e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Falk 
et al., 2005), and can be illustrated with the help of Figure 3, a box-and-whisker plot combining 
information from Figures 1 and 2 on the actual sanctions at each allocation in each treatment. The 
darker/lighter boxes correspond to the inter-quartile range of sanctions in the M/NM-treatment, 
respectively. Note that the allocations are ordered on the X-axis from those with the lowest average 
sanction in the M-treatment (on the left) to those with the highest average sanction in the same treatment 
(on the right).  
Figure 3 is consistent with the idea that inequity aversion and reciprocity are both important to 
account for the occurrence of monetary sanctions. In effect, the figure shows that the allocations where 
the average sanction is lowest are 2L and 1L, and these are the only allocations in which both inequity-
aversion and reciprocity predict punishment (see Table 2). Further, the average sanction reaches the 
highest positive level at allocations 3L and 4R, where both forces predict rewards. Finally, the average 
                                                 
17
 We complement Leibbrandt and López-Pérez (2010a) by studying whether the deciders are able to predict the sanctioners’ 
average behavior. 
  16
sanction reaches an intermediate level at the remaining allocations, where inequity-aversion and 
reciprocity predict different things.  
Figure 3 about here 
With respect to the NM-treatment, Leibbrandt and López-Pérez (2010a) find that both harm 
(help) and strict payoff equality are crucial to explain the occurrence of non-monetary punishment 
(rewards). In this line, Figure 3 shows that the average non-monetary sanction is negative if and only if 
the sanctioner is harmed and strict payoff equality is not achieved (i.e., in allocations 1L, 2L, and 4L), 
and it is positive if and only if the sanctioner is helped and/or strict payoff equality is achieved (i.e., in 
allocations 1R, 2R, 3L, 3R, and 4R).  
One possible interpretation of the previous evidence  is that the sanctioners are heterogeneous. 
With respect to monetary sanctions, for instance, there could be some types who are purely inequity-
averse, others who are reciprocal, others who are motivated by a mix of these two previous forces, and 
some who are selfish and hence never punish or reward in our games.18 When anticipating a sanction, 
therefore, the deciders should take into account the frequency of each type, the precise utility function of 
each one, etc. Let us then assume that the deciders have some priors in this respect, but possibly not 
totally accurate so that they predict sanctions with some error. Since we have games in each treatment in 
which the main forces driving sanctions make different predictions, we can explore which of these 
forces are better predicted, and hence some potential determinants of the prediction error. For this we 
use a regression approach in which the dependent variable is the (absolute) error committed by each 
decider at each allocation (recall that this variable is strongly correlated with the relative error). As 
independent variables, we use individual socio-demographic variables collected from our questionnaire 
(gender, political ideology, and religiosity), session dummies, and several key variables that refer to the 
forces mentioned above.  
 Assume for instance that many deciders in the M-treatment fail to accurately forecast an 
increase in sanctions due to increasing payoff differences, as predicted by inequity aversion. Since this 
prediction failure might depend on whether the other player is advantaged or disadvantaged, we 
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 This idea is consistent with the results from the classification analysis in Leibbrandt and López-Pérez (2010b), who also 
find some other motives apart of inequity-aversion and reciprocity apparently shaping monetary sanctions. In effect, there are 
small fractions of subjects who punish in a spiteful or maybe competitive manner, and apparently altruistic subjects who tend 
to reward always. For simplicity, our analysis here does not consider these types, as they play an arguably minor role. 
  17
distinguish two variables in this respect. The first one is called paydiff- and is defined as the difference 
between the decider’s and the sanctioner’s payoff in the corresponding allocation, provided that the 
sanctioner has a smaller payoff (otherwise, it takes value zero). For example, this variable equals 50 in 
allocation 1R, and 0 in allocation 3L. In turn, variable paydiff+ is analogously defined for the case when 
the sanctioner has a larger payoff than the decider – e.g., it takes value 0 and 100 in allocations 1R and 
3L, respectively. In addition, we consider a dummy variable called strict, which takes value 1 if players’ 
payoffs at the corresponding allocation are identical (this variable is potentially important in the NM-
treatment, as we have mentioned before).  
 Players might also fail to anticipate that reciprocity is important to explain sanctions. For this 
reason, we introduce a dummy variable Rec+, taking value 1 when reciprocity (Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger, 2004) predicts rewards, and value 0 otherwise (i.e., if reciprocity predicts punishment; see 
Table 2 for further clarification). For instance, this variable equals 0 at allocation 2L, and 1 at allocation 
4R. Finally, we consider two additional variables. One of them (spiteful type) is a dummy variable that 
takes value 1 if the corresponding decider chose allocation 2L. Since this choice harms the sanctioner 
and provides no benefit to the decider, it signals some negative predisposition towards the other player. 
We conjecture that this might have an effect on the prediction error: As these types are potentially least 
collaborative, they might be more likely to misreport their expectations or choose them randomly. 
Alternatively, if these types tend to believe that many others are like them (False consensus; consult 
Offerman, 2002; Altmann et al., 2008; Blanco et al., 2009; or Gächter and Renner, 2010; for discussion 
and additional references), this could also lead to significant mistakes. Pursuing this kind of idea further, 
we also consider a dummy variable (IA type) that takes value 1 if the corresponding decider chooses 
allocation 4L, a choice which could be a signal of inequity-aversion.  
Table 6 presents the results of four OLS regressions. The first two regressions refer to the M-
treatment. Regression (1) considers all variables, while regression (2) does not consider the socio-
demographic variables, or those which are not significant at the 10 percent level in model (1). 
Regression (3) considers all variables in the NM-treatment, and regression (4) excludes those which are 
never significant at the 10 percent significance level. We focus in what follows on regressions (2) and 
(4). Before, however, some caveats are in order. First of all, the residuals are not normally distributed, so 
that the results of hypothesis testing and the resulting p-values may not be valid. Second, OLS requires 
that the residuals be identically and independently distributed. In this respect, the Durbin-Watson d-
statistic indicates that residuals are not correlated across observations – to carry out the test, we 
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considered all observations separately; the values of the statistic fall between 1.72 and 2.23 in all 
regressions. Third, one should take the usual care in interpreting our results, because any observed 
associations may result from a spurious correlation, or even an inverse causal relationship.19 To the best 
of our knowledge, finally, we are the first to study the determinants of errors in predicting sanctions. For 
all these reasons, we stress that our regression results should be seen as preliminary and subject to 
further replication – in this vein, the web appendix shows the results of an alternative regression in 
which the main independent variables are allocation dummies. 
Table 6 about here 
In the regression (2) for the M-treatment, we observe that the independent variables paydiff- and 
paydiff+ are highly significant. The estimated coefficients tell us that for each 100 points difference, the 
prediction error increases in 9.4 and 9.9 points, respectively. This suggests that subjects’ anticipation of 
punishment/reward tend to be less accurate when the payoff differences grow larger. Similarly, the 
variable Rec+ is also significant, so if reciprocity predicts reward/punishment, the prediction error 
increases/decreases by almost 8 points. This apparent failure to anticipate the role played by reciprocity 
in explaining monetary rewards is in line with our previous evidence that subjects anticipate punishment 
better than rewards. We also observe that the players classified as spiteful make significantly higher 
errors than the other players.   
With respect to regression (4), we observe again that the payoff difference between the players is 
significantly correlated with the prediction error, as it was in the M-treatment. In contrast to the M-
treatment, however, people do not commit significantly larger mistakes when reciprocity predicts 
rewards, but they do when the allocation is strictly egalitarian (variable strict). In fact, the absolute error 
increases in almost 23 points at those allocations where both players get identical payoffs. This suggests 
that deciders do not anticipate perfectly that strict equality has a significant role on the occurrence of 
non-monetary sanctions. We also find significant evidence that those deciders classified as inequity-
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 For example, we will see that the ‘spiteful’ people choosing 2L commit very large errors. For the reasons cited above, one 
could argue that choosing 2L signals a certain preference or motivation, which in turn translates into large errors. Yet the 
other way around could be argued as well: Choice 2L might be the result of a severe inability to anticipate how the co-player 
will react (and not of any preference for allocation 2L), so that the errors are somehow the antecedent of the action. 
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averse (i.e., those choosing allocation 4L) make lower errors. Contrary to what happened in the M-
treatment, intriguingly, we do not find that the subjects classified as spiteful make larger errors.20  
3.4 Deciders’ expectations and allocation choices  
Our focus in this paper is on the accuracy of the deciders’ beliefs. Yet some readers might be 
interested in whether there is any relation between beliefs and behavior (consult Table B in Appendix A 
for a summary of the deciders’ choices). For instance, do deciders choose the allocation of the game 
with the highest expected payoff, given their beliefs? The answer is mostly affirmative. Since sanctions 
can affect the decider’s payoff only in the monetary treatment, we focus most of our discussion here on 
that treatment. In effect, we observe there that most deciders tend to choose the allocation with the 
highest expected payoff, where this expected payoff is computed as the sum of the allocation payoff and 
the sanction expected by the corresponding player. This happens in games 1, 2, 3 and 4 for respectively 
70, 91, 91, and 93 percent of the deciders. This suggests that beliefs are meaningful and taken into 
account when choosing.21  
However, one should understand that the previous percentages are only a partial indication of the 
relation between beliefs and behavior, for several reasons. A rational decider need not choose 
necessarily the allocation with the highest expected payoff, but take other motives like inequity-aversion 
into account. This can explain why in game 1, for instance, some deciders choose the more egalitarian 
allocation 1R even if they do not expect that choice to be payoff-maximizing. The data from the NM-
treatment provides even clearer evidence on this point. The frequency of deciders who choose the 
payoff-maximizing allocation in the NM-treatment can be directly computed from table B in the 
appendix, and we can see that not all players choose so in any game. As a final remark, it may be noted 
that the mere elicitation of beliefs could have primed the deciders when making their choices, so that 
any relation between beliefs and choices in our experiment must be considered with some caution.  
4. Conclusion 
This paper analyzes whether people accurately anticipate sanctions, an important question in 
order to explore compliance with social norms. In this respect, we must distinguish between average and 
individual results. On one hand, we find that the average expectation is not significantly different from 
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 This suggests that the reason why these subjects commit larger mistakes in the M-treatment is not because they choose in a 
random, careless manner. Otherwise, one would expect a similar result in the NM-treatment.   
21
 Another signal again that most subjects did not report their expectations in a random manner. 
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the average sanction at most allocations. This is remarkable in itself because it is one indication that 
subjects do not fail in a systematic manner –i.e., they are not biased. The only exceptions to this 
statement are those allocations where rewards dominate, one example of an apparent tendency to better 
anticipate the ‘stick’ than the ‘carrot’. On the other hand, we observe at the individual level that subjects 
predict the sign of the sanction correctly most of the time (the only exception to this being again one 
allocation where rewards are frequent), although they commit some errors when predicting the strength. 
Yet these errors are arguably moderate in relative terms, in particular in the case of non-monetary 
sanctions. Finally, we also find that subjects tend to forecast non-monetary sanctions with a smaller 
error than monetary ones. Since monetary sanctions are arguably not so frequently used out of the lab as 
non-monetary ones, one might speculate that subjects are more familiar with the latter, although further 
and more focused research should clarify this point. 
To our knowledge, the question of whether people anticipate accurately sanctions has not 
received systematic attention in any previous study in experimental economics. Yet our paper 
contributes to a literature on the broader field of beliefs – consult Palfrey and Wang (2009) and Blanco 
et al. (2010) for surveys. One example of this literature is Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2008), who 
study one-shot interactions and find that subjects fail to best respond to their own stated beliefs in almost 
half of the cases– in contrast, our analysis in Section 3.4 suggests that deciders in our games best 
responded most often.22 As another example, subjects in Huck and Weizsäcker (2002) have to estimate 
the choices of other subjects in a set of binary lottery-choice tasks. Subjects almost always correctly 
predict which lottery is most frequently chosen, but the elicited frequencies were systematically biased. 
Our paper is also related to a literature with a long history in the social sciences, stressing how groups of 
independently-deciding individuals come up with an accurate average prediction. For instance, Galton 
(1907) found that in a weight-judging competition at a county fair the median and average guesses were 
fairly accurate, and more recently, Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2006) show that people are able to predict 
remarkably well the duration or extent of everyday phenomena (e.g. life span, movie run time). In any 
case, subjects in all previous studies do not have to anticipate sanctions from others. In contrast, a few 
papers consider games with punishment and/or rewards and elicit beliefs about sanctions. Thus, 
Suleiman (1996) elicits proposers’ beliefs in a modified ultimatum game, finding that they are able to 
predict their counterparts’ replies to some degree. Further, Offerman (2002) considers a sequential game 
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 The difference may be due to the fact that Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2008) used 3x3 games which possibly are more 
complicated than our games. 
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where the second mover can punish or reward the first mover, or simply leave her payoff unchanged. In 
the treatment most relevant for us, the first mover’s choices and then her probabilistic beliefs about the 
second mover’s choice are elicited in an incentive-compatible manner. In contrast to our evidence, 
Offerman reports that first movers have substantial biases in predicting both punishment and reward.  
The evidence provided here has potential implications for understanding previous experimental 
evidence on the effectiveness on sanctions. For instance, at each allocation we observe some fraction of 
subjects who anticipate the wrong sign of the sanction, thus showing very inaccurate expectations. In 
this line, a failure to predict sanctions is very likely the reason why some proposers in the ultimatum 
game make low offers, which are often rejected (Güth et al. 1982; Forsythe et al. 1994). Something 
similar might occur in public good games with a punishment stage (Fehr and Gächter 2000), where  we 
observe some subjects who contribute little in the first period but then increase their contributions after 
being punished. In addition, our finding that the average subject predicts better the ‘stick’ than the 
‘carrot’ might partially account for the relative ineffectiveness of rewards observed in studies like Sefton 
et al. (2007) for public good games, Andreoni et al. (2003) for the ultimatum game, and Houser et al. 
(2008) for the trust game.  
Our study is a first attempt to systematically study players’ expectations about monetary and 
non-monetary sanctions and may encourage more research on this topic. To start, additional studies with 
different games are required to check that our results extend to other situations – as we have noted, 
Offerman (2002) offers one setting where they do not. As another example, although our evidence 
shows that the average subject predicts rather well the average sanction in most allocations, we also 
observe substantial heterogeneity in accuracy. Studying the sources of this heterogeneity seems a 
promising endeavour, with potential applications to issues like crime. In a study about shoplifting, for 
instance, Kraut (1976) shows that those who shoplifted generally underestimated both the risk of 
apprehension and the severity of the sanction. Finally, another possible research question appears when 
both types of sanctions are available: Do people correctly anticipate when each one is used by the co-
players? 
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Tables and figures: 
 
TABLE 1―THE ALLOCATIONS IN THE 4 GAMES 
Game Allocation 
Left Right 
1 (250, 100) (200, 150) 
2 (250, 100) (250, 250) 
3 (100, 200) (150, 150) 
4 (100, 200) (100, 300) 
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TABLE 2―PREDICTIONS OF MONETARY PUNISHMENT/REWARD 
Game A’s and B’s Allocation Share Predictions Left Predictions Right 
 
Left 
 
Right Punishment Reward Punishment Reward 
1 (250, 100) vs. (200, 150) IA, RP ---- IA RP 
2 (250, 100) vs. (250, 250) IA, RP ---- ---- RP 
3 (100, 200) vs. (150, 150) ---- IA, RP RP ---- 
4 (100, 200) vs. (100, 300) RP IA ---- IA, RP 
Notation: IA = Inequity aversion, RP = Reciprocity. 
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TABLE 3―Percentage of deciders expecting a positive or a negative sanction at each allocation  
 
 Game 1 Game 2 Game 3 Game 4 
Allocation (250,100) (200,150) (250,100) (250,250) (100,200) (150,150) (100,200) (100,300) 
Monetary 
treatment 
(N=46) 
% expecting 
sanction > 0 21.7 43.5 10.9 52.2 67.4 34.8 36.9 67.4 
% expecting 
sanction < 0 69.6 43.5 76.1 34.8 26.1 52.2 52.2 21.7 
Non-
monetary 
treatment 
(N=42) 
% expecting 
sanction > 0 2.4 59.5 0 61.9 64.3 36.6 19.1 78.6 
% expecting 
sanction < 0 85.7 14.3 83.3 0 4.7 30.1 59.5 0 
Note: The bold number at some allocations indicates those deciders who correctly forecast the sign of the average 
sanction (if the average sanction is non-significant at that allocation, we select no number). In allocation 1L, for 
instance, we select the deciders expecting a negative sanction, as the actual sanction is significantly negative there.     
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TABLE 4― EXPECTATIONS AND SANCTIONS AT EACH ALLOCATION: SUMMARY 
 
 Game 1 Game 2 Game 3 Game 4 
Allocation 
(250, 100) (200, 150) (250, 100) (250, 250) (100, 200) (150, 150) (100, 200) (100, 300) 
exp. sanc. exp. sanc. exp. sanc. exp. sanc. exp. sanc. exp. sanc. exp. sanc. exp. sanc. 
M
o
n
et
ar
y 
tr
ea
tm
en
t 
(N
=
46
) 
Average -26.5 -34.6 -4.3 -2.2 -42.8 -45.2 4.9 12.6 10.5 33.7 -4.1 3 -9.3 0.6 26.6 52.8 
Median -20 0 0 0 -50 -75 2.5 0 20 30 -0.4 0 -1.7 0 22.9 100 
Standard 
deviation 41.5 66.1 40.8 63.8 43.6 61.9 45 60.5 56.3 68.1 30.9 49.7 45 65.1 51.5 57.9 
N
o
n
-
m
o
n
et
ar
y 
tr
ea
tm
en
t (
N
=
42
) 
Average -24.9 -26.4 10.7 12.6 -42.5 -39.8 17.6 41.7 18.5 19.8 0.9 33.8 -13.74 -14.8 30.3 39.8 
Median -18 0 5.5 0 -33 -25 7.5 0 10 0 0 0 -7.5 0 25 35 
Standard 
deviation 25 46.6 17.9 47.7 35.9 52 25.5 50.3 29.4 56 21.4 50.3 30.7 61.9 30.1 56.7 
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Figure 1: Distribution of actual sanctions and expectations at each allocation (M-treatment) 
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Figure 2: Distribution of actual sanctions and expectations at each allocation (NM-treatment) 
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TABLE 5―AVERAGE ERRORS IN EXPECTATIONS AT EACH ALLOCATION 
 Game 1 Game 2 Game 3 Game 4 
Allocation (250,100) (200,150) (250,100) (250,250) (100,200) (150,150) (100,200) (100,300) 
M- 
treatment 
(N=46) 
Absolute 
error 
35.6 30.5 38.6 32.2 46 19.6 33.4 46.4 
Relative 
error 
26.5 29.8 26.5 28.5 34.4 19 33.2 30.4 
NM- 
treatment 
(N=42) 
Absolute 
error 
20.2 13.5 31.9 32.5 21.7 35.9 21.2 26.9 
Relative 
error 
16 12 22.9 23 18.1 26.8 18.5 19.3 
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Figure 3: Distribution of sanctions at each allocation in the M and NM-treatment 
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TABLE 6: RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Dependent Variable: Absolute prediction error 
Variables 
Monetary treatment Non-monetary treatment 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Female dummy -5.921  (4.497) ---- -2.916 (2.639) 
---- 
Ideology 0.260 (1.140) ---- 
-0.962 
(0.790) ---- 
Religiosity -0.431 (0.845) ---- 
0.791* 
(0.403) 
0.701* 
(0.394) 
Paydiff - 0.068 (0.053) 
0.094*** 
(0.031) 
0.080** 
(0.032) 
0.095*** 
(0.027) 
Paydiff + 0.104
***
 
(0.035) 
0.099*** 
(0.022) 
0.087*** 
(0.020) 
0.088*** 
(0.019) 
Rec. + 6.142 (4.010) 
7.885*** 
(2.770) 
-2.555 
(2.541) ---- 
Spiteful type 33.938
***
 
(10.961) 
32.567*** 
(10.624) 
3.557 
(2.770) ---- 
Strict -3.433 (5.824) ---- 
21.960*** 
(3.453) 
22.962*** 
(3.180) 
IA type -3.877 (4.308) ---- 
-6.472* 
(2.569) 
-5.528** 
(2.361) 
Constant 24.572
**
 
(10.045) 
16.561** 
(6.350) 
20.029*** 
(6.968) 
10.302** 
(4.194) 
N 368 368 320 328 
R-squared 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.19 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered on individual level are presented in 
parentheses. Two subjects in the NM treatment did not answer the question about their political 
ideology, and one of these two did not reveal the degree of religiosity. Therefore, in regression (3) 
instead of the possible 336 observations we have only 320, while in regression (4) we have 328. We used 
dummies to control for sessions. They proved non-significant in all cases, except in regression 4 where 
in session 2 the errors were significantly higher (by 6.689 units) than in session 3. 
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Appendix A: Additional data 
We provide here more disaggregated data on the deciders’ expectations, and use the one-sample 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test to assess whether the sample median of the expected percentage/strength 
differs significantly from the actual counterparts. Several things stand out in Table A. First, it is 
noticeable that the expected percentage is lower than the actual percentage at all allocations in both 
treatments. Further, many of these differences in the average percentages are significant, particularly in 
the NM-treatment. Regarding the strength, subjects in the M-treatment anticipate reasonably well the 
actual average sanction from the sanctioners, while these predictions are rather inaccurate in the NM-
treatment (except at allocations 1L and 4L). It seems that in the non-monetary treatment the 
underestimation of the percentage and the overestimation of the strength overall resulted in an accurate 
prediction of the average sanction. 
 
 
TABLE A ― EXPECTATIONS AND SANCTIONS AT EACH ALLOCATION: 
DISAGGREGATED DATA 
 
 Game 1 Game 2 Game 3 Game 4 
Allocation (250,100) (200,150) (250,100) (250,250) (100,200) (150,150) (100,200) (100,300) 
M- 
treatment 
(N=46) 
Percentage (exp) 48.2 45.7 54.9 38.5 56.8 29.3 43.9 53.2 
Percentage (act) 58.7 65.2 67.4 45.7 67.4 30.4 56.5 69.6 
Signed rank test  **  ***  ** – * – *** ** 
Strength (exp) -49.1 -3.2 -67.5 11.9 26.2 -11.1 -14.2 44.1 
Strength (act) -58.9 -3.3 -67.1 27.6 50.0 10.0 1.2 75.9 
Signed rank test - - ** - - * * ** 
NM- 
treatment 
(N=42) 
Percentage (exp) 35 17.9 46.8 19.3 24.2 20.7 30 32.3 
Percentage (act) 42.9 42.9 57.1 50 54.8 45.2 54.8 59.5 
Signed rank test ** *** * *** *** *** *** *** 
Strength (exp) -63.7 53.8 -81.9 87.1 65.2 16.4 -27.6 90.0 
Strength (act) -61.7 29.4 -69.6 83.3 36.1 74.7 -27.0 66.8 
Signed rank test - *** *** *** *** *** - *** 
Note: Strength (act) refers to the average choice s among those sanctioners who paid the 5 points fee. Stars indicate significant 
differences between the expected and the actual values indicated above the stars, according to the following scale: * < 0.1; ** 
< 0.05; *** < 0.01. Symbol – appears when differences are not significant at 10 % level. 
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TABLE B―Deciders’ Choices  
Game Allocation 
percentage 
(M-treatment) 
percentage 
(NM-treatment) 
  Left   Right Left Right Left Right 
1 (250,100)  vs.  (200,150)  60.9 39.1 78.6 21.4 
2 (250,100)  vs. (250,250) 10.9 89.1 9.5 90.5 
3 (100,200)  vs. (150,150) 30.4 69.6 4.8 95.2 
4 (100,200)  vs. (100,300) 26.1 73.9 23.8 76.2 
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Web appendix **Not to be published** 
Instructions for Participant A (Monetary Treatment) 
Welcome to this experiment on decision making. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid 
some money; the precise amount will depend on your decisions and the decisions of another participant. 
During the experiment we always speak of points; note that 
10 points = 1 Euro 
Please, do not talk to any other participant during the experiment. If you do not follow this rule 
we will have to exclude you from the experiment and you will not earn any money. If you have 
questions, please raise your hand and we will attend you. 
There are two types of participants in this experiment: A and B. There is the same number of 
participants of each type. Previously, the instructor has distributed in a random manner the same number 
of instructions for each type across the room. Given your seat choice, you are a type A participant. 
Further, you will be anonymously matched with a type B participant (in what follows, we call 
him/her B). You will never know the type of any other participant, nor will any other participant get to 
know your type. The decisions in this experiment are anonymous. This means no participant will ever 
know which participant made which choice. 
Description of the Experiment 
 
  
You, as player A, and B will take decisions in four scenarios, all of them with a two-stage 
structure. In the first stage of each scenario, you have to decide between two allocations of points for 
you and B. In the hypothetical example of the figure, the left-hand allocation gives 150 points to you and 
150 points to B. The right-hand allocation gives 390 points to you and 60 points to B.  
 
 
 
Remember: 10 points = 1 Euro.  
 
A: 150 
B: 150 
A: 390 
B: 60 
 A 
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In the second stage of each scenario, B can affect your balance. For this, B must pay previously 5 
points. If B pays the 5 points, B can then assign to you any amount of points between -100 and +100. 
This amount will decrease or increase your balance by the same amount. If B chooses not to pay the 5 
points, she cannot assign any points to you so that the allocation chosen by you is implemented. 
 
Example 1: Suppose that you choose the left-hand allocation in the previously illustrated 
scenario and that B then decides to spend the 5 points and assigns to you +60 points. Then you would 
have a balance of 150 + 60 = 210, and B would get 150 – 5 = 145 points.  
Example 2: Suppose that you choose the right-hand allocation in the previously illustrated 
scenario and that B then decides to spend the 5 points and assigns to you -30 points. Then you would 
have a balance of 390-30 = 360, and B would have 60-5 = 55 points.  
  
Important: When deciding, B will not know the allocation actually chosen by you in any 
scenario. For this reason, B will indicate her decision for any possible choice by you at any scenario. 
Following with the example of the figure, B should answer four questions: (1) Would you pay the 5 
points if A had chosen (150, 150)?, (2) in case you pay the 5 points, what amount of points (between -
100 and +100) would you assign then to A?, (3) and (4) the same questions if A had chosen (390, 60). 
After all participants have taken their decisions in the four scenarios and answered a brief 
questionnaire, the instructor will collect your form. Afterwards, one scenario will be chosen randomly 
(with the roll of a die). This is important because any participant will be paid only for her/his final point 
score in that scenario (the instructor will divide that score by 10). To finish, note that you will be paid in 
private and that we will inform you in that moment about B’s choice in the payment-relevant game 
(without, of course, revealing B’s identity). 
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Before we proceed with the experiment, please answer the following control questions. Raise your 
hand after that so that we can verify that the answers are correct. 
In the hypothetical example of the figure, assume the following: (a) B decides to pay the 5 points if A 
had chosen allocation (A: 150, B: 150), and assigns then +100 points to A, (b) B decides not to pay the 5 
points if A had chosen allocation (A: 390, B: 60). 
  
 
 
 
 
Taking into account all this, answer the following questions,  
• What would be the final point score of A if she/he chooses (A: 150, B: 150)? _______ 
• What would be the final point score of B if A chooses (A: 150, B: 150)? ___________ 
• What would be the final point score of A if she/he chooses (A: 390, B: 60)? ________ 
• What would be the final point score of B if A chooses (A: 390, B: 60)? ____________ 
 
In addition: 
• Will you know any of the decisions taken by B before you have made your decision in all four 
scenarios?  Yes          No 
• Will B know any of your effective decisions before B has made her/his decision in all four 
scenarios?  Yes          No 
• How many scenarios has this experiment? __________ 
• How many scenarios will be relevant for your payment? __________ 
• Can B ever affect your balance without spending 5 points?     Yes       No  
 
A: 150 
B: 150 
A: 390 
B: 60 
 A 
  39
 
Decisions of a type-A participant 
 
The 4 scenarios 
 
 
For your information, we present here the point allocations available in each of the 4 scenarios. In the 
next sheets, you can take your decisions in each scenario. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: In the next sheets, you can take your decisions in any order as you wish (that is, you do not need 
to start deciding in scenario 1). Until we collect your decision form, moreover, you can always change 
your decision in any scenario if you decide so (to facilitate this, you can initially use a pencil; write 
down your final decision with a pen, though). 
 
 
 
A: 250 
B: 100 
A: 200 
B: 150 
 A 
A: 250 
B: 100 
A: 250 
B: 250 
 A 
Scenario 2 
A: 100 
B: 200 
A: 150 
B: 150 
 A 
Scenario 3 
A: 100 
B: 200 
A: 100 
B: 300 
 A 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
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Scenario 1 
                                             
 
                        Recall: 10 points = 1 Euro 
 
 
 
The point allocation that I choose in this scenario is (select it with a circle):  
  
• A: 250, B: 100 
 
• A: 200, B: 150 
 
Independently of your previous choice, we kindly ask you to make a series of estimations (your 
answers here will not affect your final payoff): 
 
 
 
• What is the percentage of participants B that will pay the 5 points if A chooses (250, 100)? 
________  (this must be a number between 0 and 100, both included) 
 
 
 
• In the previous case, how many points (in average) will these B-participants assign to the A-
participant? ________   (this must be a number between -100 and 100, both included) 
 
• What is the percentage of participants B that will pay the 5 points if A chooses (200, 150)? 
________  (this must be a number between 0 and 100, both included) 
 
• In the previous case, how many points (in average) will these B-participants assign to the A-
participant? ________   (this must be a number between -100 and 100, both included) 
 
 
A: 250 
B: 100 
A: 200 
B: 150 
 A 
  41
Instructions for Participant A (Non-Monetary Treatment) 
Welcome to this experiment on decision making. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid 
some money; the precise amount will depend on your decisions and the decisions of another participant. 
During the experiment we always speak of points; note that 
10 points = 1 Euro 
Please, do not talk to any other participant during the experiment. If you do not follow this rule 
we will have to exclude you from the experiment and you will not earn any money. If you have 
questions, please raise your hand and we will attend you. 
There are two types of participants in this experiment: A and B. There is the same number of 
participants of each type. Previously, the instructor has distributed in a random manner the same number 
of instructions for each type across the room. Given your seat choice, you are a type A participant. 
Further, you will be anonymously matched with a type B participant (in what follows, we call 
him/her B). You will never know the type of any other participant, nor will any other participant get to 
know your type. The decisions in this experiment are anonymous, that is, no participant will ever know 
which participant made which choice. 
 
Description of the Experiment 
 
  
You, as player A, and B will take decisions in four scenarios, all of them with a two-stage 
structure. In the first stage of each scenario, you have to decide between two allocations of points for 
you and B. In the hypothetical example of the figure, the left-hand allocation gives 150 points to you and 
150 points to B. The right-hand allocation gives 390 points to you and 60 points to B.  
 
 
 
Remember: 10 points = 1 Euro.  
 
A: 150 
B: 150 
A: 390 
B: 60 
 A 
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In the second stage of each scenario, B cannot affect your balance, but can approve or disapprove 
your prior choice. For this, B must pay 5 points. If B pays the 5 points, B can then assign an evaluation 
score between -100 and +100 to you. A negative score indicates that B disapproves your choice (-100 is 
maximum disapproval), while a positive score indicates that B approves your choice (+100 is maximum 
approval). We note again that, whatever its sign, this score will not affect your balance. If B chooses not 
to pay the 5 points, B cannot assign a score to you 
 
Example 1: Suppose that you choose the left-hand allocation in the previously illustrated 
scenario and that B then decides to spend the 5 points and assign a score of +60 to you. That means that 
B approve your choice with intensity equal to 60 out of 100. Note also that your balance is unchanged 
(you get 150 points), whereas B would get 150 – 5 = 145 points.  
Example 2: Suppose that you choose the right-hand allocation in the previously illustrated 
scenario and that B then decides to spend the 5 points and assign a score of -30 to you. That means that 
B disapproves your choice with intensity equal to 30 out of 100. Note also that your balance is 
unchanged (you get 390 points), whereas B would get 60 – 5 = 55 points. 
  
Important: When deciding, B will not know the allocation actually chosen by you in any 
scenario. For this reason, B will indicate her decision for any possible choice by you at any scenario. 
Following with the example of the figure, B should answer four questions: (1) Would you pay the 5 
points if A had chosen (150, 150)?, (2) in case you pay the 5 points, what score (between -100 and 
+100) would you assign then to A?, (3) and (4) the same questions if A had chosen (390, 60). 
After all participants have taken their decisions in the four scenarios and answered a brief 
questionnaire, the instructor will collect your form. Afterwards, one scenario will be chosen randomly 
(with the roll of a die). This is important because any participant will be paid only for her/his final point 
score in that scenario (the instructor will divide that score by 10). To finish, note that everyone will be 
paid in private and that we will inform you in that moment about the evaluation score that B assigned to 
you in the payment-relevant game (without, of course, revealing B’s identity). 
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Before we proceed with the experiment, please answer the following control questions. Raise your 
hand after that so that we can verify that the answers are correct. 
In the hypothetical example of the figure, suppose that A chooses allocation (A: 150, B: 150) and that B 
decides to pay the 5 points, and assigns then a score +100 to A. In this case: 
• What would be A’s final balance? _______ 
• Does B approve or disapprove A’s choice? ___________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Suppose now that A chooses allocation (A: 390, B: 60) and that B decides not to pay the 5 points. 
• What would be A’s final balance then? ________ 
• What would be B’s final balance then? ____________ 
In addition: 
• Will you know any of the decisions taken by B before you have made your decision in all four 
scenarios?  Yes          No 
• Will B know any of your decisions before she/he has made her/his decision in all four scenarios?  
Yes          No 
• How many scenarios has this experiment? __________ How many scenarios will be relevant for 
your payment? __________ 
• Can B ever affect your balance?     Yes       No 
 
  
A: 150 
B: 150 
A: 390 
B: 60 
 A 
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W1. Cumulative distribution functions of the expectations and the actual sanctions at 
each allocation of the monetary treatment 
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W2. Cumulative distribution functions of the expectations and the actual sanctions at 
each allocation of the non-monetary treatment 
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W3. Test results: P-values 
Allocation 
Game 1 Game 2 Game 3 Game 4 
(250,100) (200,150) (250,100) (250,250) (100,200) (150,150) (100,200) (100,300) 
M- 
treatment 
(N=46) 
MW 0.4674 0.7589 0.3008 0.9111 0.0985 0.2601 0.3959 0.0067 
Levene 0.0000 0.0132 0.0010 0.0555 0.0355 0.1949 0.1194 0.0844 
KS 0.007 0.284 0.003 0.128 0.000 0.003 0.128 0.000 
NM- 
treatment 
(N=42) 
MW 0.1170 0.2570 0.6261 0.4158 0.4445 0.0024 0.7322 0.6981 
Levene 0.0000 0.0001 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
KS 0.000 0.035 0.035 0.009 0.097 0.009 0.159 0.035 
 
We report the p-values for the following tests:  
(Mann-Whitney, MW) H0 for each allocation:  average expectation = average sanction.  
(Levene) H0 for each allocation: variance of expectations = variance of sanctions. 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov; KS)  H0 for each allocation: expectations and sanctions come from the same distribution.  
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W4. Disaggregated data on the sanctioners’ behavior 
We provide here a more detailed picture of punishment and reward by the sanctioners in our two 
treatments. Table B1 shows for each allocation of each game in the M-treatment, the frequency of 
sanctioners who invested five points to punish, the average score s chosen by those players who 
punished, and the same figures with respect to rewards. In game 1, for instance, we observe that 45.7 
percent of the sanctioners punish at the left-hand allocation (250/100), and that the average punishment 
is s = -99.5. The corresponding numbers for rewards in the same allocation are 13 percent and s = 83.3.  
 
TABLE B1―Punishment and reward in the M-treatment: Frequency and strength 
 
  Monetary punishment Monetary reward 
Game 
Allocation Left Right Left Right 
Left   Right % average % average % average % average 
1 (250,100) vs. (200,150) 45.7 99.5 37 68.2 13 83.3 28.3 81.5 
2 (250,100) vs. (250,250) 56.5 93.5 17.4 77.5 10.9 70 28.3 92.3 
3 (100,200) vs. (150,150) 15.2 87.1 15.2 75.1 52.2 90 15.2 95.7 
4 (100,200) vs. (100,300) 28.3 80 6.5 80 28.3 82.3 63 92.1 
 Table B2 is the analogue of B1 for the NM-treatment. It presents for each allocation of each 
game, (a) the percentage of sanctioners who invested five points to punish in a non-monetary manner 
(i.e., disapprove), (b) average disapproval among those players who disapproved, and the same figures 
with respect to non-monetary reward (i.e., approval). In game 1, for instance, we observe that 38.1 
percent of the sanctioners disapprove the choice of allocation 1L, and that the average disapproval is of s 
= -78.8. The corresponding numbers for approval in the same allocation are 4.8 percent and s = 75. 
 
TABLE B2―Disapproval and approval in the NM-treatment: Frequency and strength 
 
  Disapproval Approval 
Game 
Allocation Left Right Left Right 
Left   Right % average % average % average % average 
1 (250,100) vs. (200,150) 38.1 78.8 14.3 58.3 4.8 75 28.6 73.3 
2 (250,100) vs. (250,250) 52.4 82.7 2.4 60 4.8 75 47.6 90.5 
3 (100,200) vs. (150,150) 16.7 65.7 2.4 100 38.1 80.6 42.9 84.4 
4 (100,200) vs. (100,300) 35.7 83.3 7.1 80 20.1 78.8 52.4 86.8 
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W5. Alternative regressions 
For informative purposes, we include here the results from two regressions (one for each 
treatment) using alternative independent variables than those used in section 3.3. In particular, we 
include one dummy variable for each allocation except one (to prevent multicollinearity). The non-
included allocation is that with the lowest average absolute error in each treatment, that is, allocation 3R 
in the M-treatment, and 1R in the NM-treatment.  
RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Dependent Variable: Absolute prediction error 
Variables Monetary treatment Non-Monetary treatment Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error 
Female dummy -10.560** 5.248 -3.087 2.549 
Ideology 0.694 1.377 -1.024 0.815 
Religiosity -0.841 0.775 0.796* 0.401 
Spiteful type 25.304** 11.162 4.084 2.664 
Pessimism 2.164** 1.072 1.134 1.702 
IA type -0.210 6.100 -7.996* 4.205 
All1L 17.802* 9.083 6.222* 3.232 
All1R 12.693 8.918 ---- 
All2L 20.753** 8.593 18.055*** 3.308 
All2R 13.078** 5.881 19.065*** 2.371 
All3L 36.775*** 9.139 8.561** 3.368 
All3R ---- 22.119*** 3.006 
All4L 24.193*** 8.734 7.908* 4.212 
All4R 37.191*** 9.055 13.849*** 3.236 
Session1 9.405 7.748 -0.569 2.267 
Session2 0.164 5.829 4.015 3.797 
Session3 7.963 8.461 ---- 
Constant 8.391 9.829 18.180*** (4.233) 
N 368 320 
R-squared 0.25 0.23 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered on individual level. Two subjects in the NM-
treatment did not answer the question about their political ideology, and one of these two did not reveal the degree of 
religiosity.  
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W6. Density functions of the errors: Absolute error in the monetary treatment  
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Relative error in the monetary treatment 
 
 
 
 
0
.
5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
D
en
sit
y
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Relative error
Kernel density estimate
Normal density
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0694
Allocation 1L (250,100) in the monetary treatment
0
.
5
1
1.
5
D
en
sit
y
0 .5 1
Relative error
Kernel density estimate
Normal density
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.1082
Allocation 1R (200,150) in the monetary treatment
0
1
2
3
D
en
sit
y
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Relative error
Kernel density estimate
Normal density
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0491
Allocation 2L (250,100) in the monetary treatment
0
1
2
3
D
en
sit
y
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Relative error
Kernel density estimate
Normal density
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0683
Allocation 2R (250,250) in the monetary treatment
0
.
5
1
1.
5
2
D
en
sit
y
0 .5 1
Relative error
Kernel density estimate
Normal density
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.1160
Allocation 3L (100,200) in the monetary treatment
0
1
2
3
D
en
sit
y
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Relative error
Kernel density estimate
Normal density
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0753
Allocation 3R (150,150) in the monetary treatment
0
.
5
1
1.
5
D
en
sit
y
0 .5 1
Relative error
Kernel density estimate
Normal density
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.1303
Allocation 4L (100,200) in the monetary treatment
0
1
2
3
D
en
sit
y
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Relative error
Kernel density estimate
Normal density
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0521
Allocation 4R (100,300) in the monetary treatment
  51
Signed relative error in the M-treatment 
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W7. Density functions of the errors: Non-Monetary treatment 
Absolute error in the NM-treatment 
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Relative error in the NM-treatment 
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Signed relative error in the NM-treatment 
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